Introduction
Ever since the development of the theoretical model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) identifying the rôle of asymmetric information in insurance markets, the search for empirical evidence on adverse selection has yielded conflicting findings depending on the characteristics of the particular market (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010) . A common approach has been to investigate the positive correlation property, whereby higher-risk individuals buy more insurance. In the context of life annuities, higher risk corresponds to higher life expectancy and a direct test would be that individuals who have private information about their life expectancy select into back-loaded annuity products and hence individuals who buy back-loaded products live longer. However, this test is not feasible because we do not have the relevant data. An indirect test of the same phenomenon is whether life assurers recognise adverse selection and price accordingly, leading to different money's worths for different annuity products. This has been studied in a number of papers (Mitchell et al, 1999; Poterba, 2002, 2004; Tonks, 2004, 2008) who have examined the pricing of life annuities using the money's worth metric, defined as the ratio of the expected value of annuity payments to the premium paid. 1 Two stylised facts that emerge from this literature are that typically (i) the money's worth is less than one; and (ii) the money's worth of back-loaded annuities is less than that for front-loaded annuities. 2 For example, Table 5 of Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) (hereafter F&P) reports that in the U.K.'s compulsory annuity market the money's worth of level annuities (which pay a constant income for life) for 65-year old males is 0.900, but for real annuities 1 James and Song (2001) provide an international comparison of money's worth studies. Cannon and Tonks (2008, ch. 6 ) report further money's worth calculations for the United Kingdom, Chile, Switzerland, Australia and Singapore. Since then further analyses have been conducted for Canada (Milevsky and Shao, 2011) ; for Germany (Kaschützke and Maurer, 2011) ; for the Netherlands (Cannon, Stevens and Tonks, 2012) ; for Singapore (Fong, Mitchell and Koh, 2011) ; and for Switzerland (Bütler and Staubli, 2011) . The money's worth has also been used in analysis of decision making by Fong, Lemaire and Tse (2011) .
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(which pay an income that is indexed to the rate of inflation) is 0.825. These two observations have been interpreted as evidence of adverse selection, that annuitants have more information about their life expectancy than insurance companies, and select into different types of annuities, which is then reflected in equilibrium annuity prices. 3 However, in this paper we demonstrate that these facts would also be consistent with a model where there were no adverse selection and where the variation in annuity rates for different types of annuity were due to the different costs of supplying annuities. Either because life assurers are prudent or because of regulatory requirements, riskier liabilities such as real annuities have to be priced to ensure sufficient reserves are available and matched to similar real assets and these effects make them more costly. We identify three additional costs for real annuities: greater cohort risk; greater idiosyncratic risk and greater management costs. The last two additional costs could, in principle, be measured fairly easily if adequate data were available and in this paper we discuss the extent to which this is possible. The first additional cost will be shown to be more problematic. The route by which cohort risk and adverse selection affect annuity prices is the same, namely the duration of the annuity. This makes identifying the importance of the two explanations for annuity prices difficult or impossible. In this paper we quantify the costs of the risks and show they are sufficiently large to explain much of the observed variations in the money's worth, leaving a less important rôle for adverse selection.
We approach this problem by modelling explicitly the risky nature of an annuity liability. In all of the papers that we have cited the money's worth calculations are "deterministic", in the sense that it is implicitly assumed that survival probabilities for the cohort of annuitants are known. Even if a life assurer has a sufficiently large pool of annuitants to diversify away idiosyncratic risk, it still needs to forecast the future survival probabilities and such forecasts are risky. Combined with prudential or regulatory reasons to avoid downside risk this means that, the greater the risk of a liability, the greater the reserves needed by the life assurer to ensure that the 4 liability can be met. In this paper we introduce the concept of the stochastic money's worth which takes into account the uncertainty faced by annuity providers predicting long-run mortality. We suggest that estimates of the stochastic money's worth are the appropriate risk metric for life assurers.
The attitude of public policy to the pricing of annuities is multi-faceted. Low annuity rates result in lower income streams for pensioners and the risk that they will be entitled to more means-tested benefits; as voters they may also complain more. For these reasons governments wants annuity rates to be high. On the other hand, high annuity rates correspond to higher future annuity payouts by providers for a given premium, raising questions about the providers' future solvency. In its capacity as financial regulator, the government would not want annuity rates too high if this meant that annuity providers might end up failing, because then pensioners would end up in poverty and the government would have to compensate them either through a direct rescue or by paying higher means-tested benefits.
In the United Kingdom, where the compulsory annuity market is large -worth £11 billion per year (HM Treaury, 2010b) and is an important component of pension provision, the government has faced both problems in the recent past, and continues to do so. Annuity rates have fallen consistently since 1994, which has proved politically sensitive, prompting the Department of Work and Pensions to investigate the cause of these reductions (Cannon and Tonks, 2009 ). In the popular press, low annuity rates have been cited as a reason for removing the compulsory annuitisation requirement in the UK.
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At the same time, the UK government is still dealing with the failure of Equitable Life to provide sufficient reserves for a set of guaranteed annuities sold in the 1980s.
This became apparent in the late 1990s and resulted in a court case in 2000 (Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman) followed by the Penrose Report of 2004.
The most recent "Abrahams" report (Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, 2008) As is made explicit in text books such as Booth et al (2005) , actuaries take risk into account when pricing annuities. To gain some idea of the magnitude of this issue in the UK, we may examine the life assurers' FSA Returns. As a regulated industry, each life assurer must declare the actuarial assumptions used to value its liabilities, by comparing the mortalities used in its own calculations with the mortalities in the 6 benchmark tables produced by the Institute of Actuaries' Continuous Mortality
Investigation. The CMI collects data from all of the major life assurers, aggregates and anonymises it and then analyses the pooled data. So the CMI tables of mortality approximate to the average mortalities across the whole industry. The figures presented in life assurers' FSA returns are then compared to this average and we summarise the figures for the major annuity providers in Table 1 and illustrate them in Figure 1 .
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[ Table 1 about here]
[ Figure 1 about here]
In investigating annuity pricing, one of the problems for researchers is knowing which benchmark series is appropriate. F&P (2002) used the "life office pensioner" mortality table, which reports mortalities of members of occupational definedbenefit pension schemes administered by life assurers: the most recent version of this table is PCMA00, which is very similar to the series for DC pensioners. Since annuitants are defined-contribution (DC) pensioners, this is arguably the wrong series, but the more relevant DC personal pensioners described by PPMC00 is based on a relatively small sample, so we prefer to follow F&P (2002) . Figure 1 shows that up to age 67, only Canada Life assumes higher mortality than the benchmark: for ages greater than 68, every life assurer assumes lower mortality rates than the benchmark. So every life assurer is assuming that their annuitants' mortality is lower than the average (and life expectancy is greater than average).
Some of the variation in assumptions between companies must be due to genuine variations in mortality of the annuitants, but it is obviously impossible that e very company has lower mortality than the average. This is prima facie evidence that firms are building some allowance for mortality risk into their valuations. 5 The CMI tables include four benchmark life tables for different annuity groups: PCMA00, RMC00, RMV00 and PPMC00. PCMA00 reports the mortalities of members of occupational defined-benefit pension schemes administered by life assurers; RMC00 and RMV00 summarise the mortality evidence of the original DC pensions -retirement annuity contracts for self-employed workers; RMV is for pensioners in receipt of a pension ("vested") and RMC is for both pensioners in receipt of a pension and for those still making contributions ("combined"); and PPMC00 reports mortalities of DC personal pensioners. Using a different benchmark would not affect our conclusions. However, the remaining large risks faced by a life assurer relate to the cohort mortality risk of the group of annuitants born in a particular period (Telford et al, 2010) . This cohort mortality risk cannot be diversified away, and instead under prudential risk management life insurers reserve assets to allow for the possibility of decreases in cohort mortalities. We introduce a stochastic money's worth metric, and compute the distribution of the present value of annuity payments that allows for uncertainty in these cohort mortalities. It is possible to quantify mortality risk through stochastic mortality models such as that of Lee and Carter (1992) , which allow us to estimate the probability distribution of future mortality. The traditional risk-neutral approach to pricing annuities is to set the price equal to the expected present value of the promised annuity payments, yielding a money's worth equal to unity (or slightly less than unity after allowing for the costs or loadings associated with the annuity provision We start by describing in section 2 the conventional money's worth measure and how it is calculated in practice. We then briefly review the theory of adverse selection in the annuity market in section 3 and discuss whether it is appropriate to characterise the market as being a separating equilibrium. In section 4 we review the evidence for the money's worth in the UK. In section 5 we show how a probability distribution of the value of an annuity can be constructed using a stochastic mortality model. We use this to measure the risk for annuities and the consequences when a researcher calculates the money's worth based on a deterministic projection of mortality while annuity providers are pricing to take into account the financial risk associated with mortality risk and a given set of interest rates. 9
Money's Worth Calculations

The (Conventional) Money's Worth
The conventional measure of the value of an annuity is the money's worth (Warshawsky, 1988; Mitchell et al, 1999) , which compares the expected present value of the annuity payments with the price paid for the annuity. We define the annuity rate A as the ratio of annual payments to the actual purchase price of an annuity. 8 Then the money's worth for a 65-year old would be
,65 , 65 65 0
Money's Worth 12
where p t+i,65+i is the one-period survival probability for the annuitant who is age 65+i
in period t+i (that is the probability of living one more period conditional on being alive at the beginning of the period) and s x is thus the probability of the current 65-year-old living to age x or longer. It is conventional in money's worth calculations to try to use the survival probablity actually in use at time t rather than the ex post survival probabilities of the annuitants and hence the money's worth is written in
The discount factor
, tj R is usually inferred from the yield curve on government bonds and it is assumed that this rate of return is risk free. As with the survival probabilities, the yields used are those in force at the time of the sale of the annuity rather than returns which might have been available thereafter.
There are two possible justifications for using government yields. The first is that annuity payments are meant to be secure (i.e. the chances of default are minimal) and the interest rate on government bonds is typically the best possible guess at the "safe" rate of interest. For some countries the interest rate on government debt would not be risk free, but this seems a reasonable approximation for countries such as the U.K. for which debt is typically AAA rated. Where life assurers use commercial bonds (or commercial mortgages), they must adjust the higher rates of return for the greater risk and, to a good approximation, the risk-adjusted rates of return on commercial bonds or mortgages are likely to be the same as the rates of 8 For example, in the UK in July 2009, the Prudential would sell an annuity for £10,000 to a 65-year old man which would pay a monthly income of £61, or £732 annually for life: the annuity rate would be 
Survival Probabilities for the (Conventional) Money's Worth
Equation (1) requires us to know the probability of living ,65 t i i p  , or equivalently the probability of dying, referred to as the mortality. 11 The estimation of these variables is a staple of actuarial textbooks (Bowers et al, 1997; Pitacco et al, 2009 ), but forecasting these variables is more problematic and usually relies on extrapolating the past trend, since models based on the causes of death are insufficiently precise to be used for prediction purposes. The resulting estimate is subject to uncertainty from a variety of sources.
The estimates will be based on data available up to time t (or possibly earlier if there are lags in data collection): other than measurement errors, there is also the problem that death rates are not quite the same as death probabilities and there may be considerable sampling error if the death rates are based on relatively small samples (which is often the case for the highest ages). There may be additional changes in the data generating process either because the health of annuitants changes relative to that of the population as a whole or because the health of pensioners is different from others and pension coverage changes -these are two different forms of a selection effect. In many countries sufficiently detailed data for p are simply unavailable and the U.K. is unusual in having reliable data for pensioners over a long time period: since 1924, U.K. life offices have provided their firm-level data to a central committee of actuaries who anonymised and pooled this 9 Details of the notional yields, credit ratings and corresponding adjustments are reported in the FSA returns. Price risk is relatively unimportant since bonds are typically held to maturity.
10 CGFS (2011) provides a review of international insurance regulation and notes that this matching can be duration matching which only partially matches liability and asset cash flows and cash-flow matching which perfectly matches the flows. The footnotes of various FSA returns note that perfect matching is impossible and that there is a small residual risk. This matching is likely to be more difficult for RPIlinked annuities and we return to that issue in section 3.4. 11 More formally, mortality  is the continuous-time analogue of the one-year death
information to create a large enough data set to enable reliable statistical analysis and long-term projections. Until 1999 (i.e. the "92" series) the projections were only updated infrequently. The "interim adjustments" to this series in 2002 allowed for three different scenarios and the "00" series of 2006 did not even attempt to project mortality into the future but simply described the evolution of the data up to 2002.
When we estimate the money's worth we use the contemporaneous benchmark tables and projections.
Second, there is model uncertainty. Most models' starting point is Gompertz's Law, i.e. the empirical regularity is that the logarithm of death rates tends to increase approximately linearly. The caveats to this are that: the decline is only approximately linear; the speed of decline depends upon age; and there are occasional structural breaks, which may apply either to the whole population or to just some cohorts. There is also some doubt as to whether one should look at the logarithm of the death rate or a logistic function and whether the decline is a stochastic or deterministic trend (Cairns et al, 2009 ).
Estimates of the Money's Worth
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate respectively our monthly annuity rate data for 65-year old men in the UK compulsory purchase market 12 and the money's worths for annuities for three different ages (65, 70, 75) . To allow for the fact that mortality projections were changing during this period, we calculate the money's worth using the relevant mortalities for each period from the Institute of Actuaries (the annuity rate data and interest rate data are the same throughout), with a small overlap to allow for uncertainty over the precise point at which a new table should be introduced .
Each new actuarial table tends to result in an increase in the money's worth due to longer projected life expectancy, but the medium cohort projection and the PNML00 projection match almost exactly. The evidence in Figure 3 suggests that there was a fairly small decline in money's worths for a male aged 65, but little change for males aged 70 or 75: in fact the range of money's worths fell considerably.
[ Table 3 provides formal tests of the differences in money's worths over the four sub-periods of our data with respect to the relevant actuarial life table. In Panel A of Table 3 we compute the average money's worth by age, and examine whether there are significant differences between the money's worths of annuities at different ages. We test for the equality of means of these series, using a "matched pair" analysis to deal with trends in the series. We take the difference between any two series and evaluate the autocorrelation function to choose appropriate lag length. We then calculate the tstatistic for the mean value of these differences, using Newey West standard errors, with the relevant adjustment for the autocorrelation structure. The reversal of the [ Table 3 Table 3 shows the money's worth for annuities with guarantee periods, although there is little difference in the money's worths of these guarantees. Figure 5 and Panel C of Table 3 shows the money's worths for level, real and escalating annuities: we are able to confirm the findings of F&P (2002) Overall, our analysis for the money's worth over the whole period largely confirms that of F&P (2002) . The caveats are that the differences in money's worth by age or guarantee period have disappeared by the end of the period. However, we now suggest an alternative interpretation to F&P on explaining the pattern in these money's worths.
Adverse selection in Annuity Markets
A simple model of adverse selection
To formalise the implications of asymmetric information for the money's worth we need to consider a model of adverse selection, similar to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) In the UK compulsory purchase market, individuals must annuitise their pension wealth.
14 F&P (2002, 2004) suggest that an adverse selection separating equilibrium could be achieved through agents with different life expectancies buying different products, since product type is the only choice open to a personal pensioner.
Agents maximise respectively:
We discuss the details of this assumption in section 3.3.
14 We also assume that agents have the same felicity function   
where r is the wholesale interest rate earned by the life assurer on assets matching the annuity liability. If an annuity makes payments in nominal terms r is the nominal interest rate and if the annuity makes payments indexed to the price level then r is the RPI-indexed (real) interest rate.
[ Figure 6 about here]
The budget constraints and indifference curves are plotted in Figure 6 , which looks like the standard diagram for the R&S model of insurance. However, there are subtle differences: first, whereas in the R&S model the two axes show consumption in the two different states of the world, in this diagram the vertical axis shows the certain consumption in period one and the horizontal axis shows how much the individual consumes conditional on surviving into period two; second, at any point on the budget constraint an annuitant is fully insured in the sense that he will not outlive his resources (the only way to be under-insured against longevity risk is to invest some wealth in non-annuity form, which cannot be shown in this diagram).
So different points along a budget constraint do not show different levels of insurance but different consumption paths through time: for example point A has the same level of consumption in both periods (e.g. a real annuity) whereas point B has a higher level of consumption in period one (e.g. a nominal annuity during a period of inflation) at the expense of lower consumption in period two.
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In an R&S separating equilibrium, a life assurer would offer two contracts, at A and B. High-life-expectancy annuitants would choose a back-loaded contract A, whereas low-life-expectancy agents would choose a front-loaded contract B. The diagram illustrates the requirements necessary for a separating equilibrium to exist:
the two types of annuitant must have indifference curves with different slopes and it must be possible to offer a contract such as B, where consumption in period one is higher than consumption in period two. How much consumption must be higher in period one than period two depends upon the convexity of the high-life-expectancy individual's indifference curve. The separating equilibrium is achieved through agents' inter-temporal substitution of consumption rather than variations in the amount of insurance purchased.
We can now determine the consequences of these equilibria for the money's worths of the two contracts that would be calculated by a researcher. If information were available on survival probabilities of both high-and low-risk annuitants then the money's worths for both contracts should equal one (from the fact that the contracts are actuarially fair). In reality, the only survival probability available to the researcher is that provided by the CMI for the whole pool of annuitants. This observed survival probability is
where  is the proportion of the annuitant population which is low-life expectancy and the researcher only has access to p , not information on [ 
means that in this model it will actually be very close to one. The fact that it is virtually never that high suggests a rôle for administrative costs in explaining the money's worth.
Forecast rather than known survival probabilities
In this section we consider a simple model of cohort mortality risk where there is no annuitant heterogeneity (and hence no adverse selection), but the life assurer must reserve against cohort mortality risk, ensuring that it acts as if risk averse. This assumption is a major difference from the risk neutrality assumed in the previous section which determined the break-even condition of equation (2). A simple way to characterise this risk aversion, consistent with Solvency II regulations, would be to assume that the life assurer uses a Value-at-Risk method based on an appropriate percentile of the perceived distribution of cohort survival probabilities so that the new break-even annuity price equation is
where % C p is the appropriate centile from the distribution of projected probabilities.
Since there is no adverse selection, the only differences are between types of annuity product: level, escalating and real. From equation (7) the resulting money's worth calculated by a researcher for each product would now be A further problem with real annuities is that the number of annuitants is much smaller, as we have seen in Table 2 This simple model suggests that observed pattern of money's worths may be due to pricing annuities to account for cohort mortality risk rather than due to adverse selection. In section 4 we will undertake simulations to assess whether the magnitude of reserving is significant. Before those calculations we make a few additional points about the money's worth.
Additional comments on the plausibility of the adverse selection model and the rôle of administrative costs
In this section we make some qualitative remarks about the adverse-selection separating-equilibrium characterisation of the annuity market and the issue of costs. Discussion of adverse selection in insurance markets normally centres on whether agents purchase full or partial insurance. In the UK it is virtually obligatory for a personal pensioner to purchase an annuity with at least 75 per cent of the value of the pension fund (up to 25 per cent can always be taken as a tax -free lump sum). In principle it is possible to avoid annuitisation until age 75 and even then one can avoid annuitising all of one's pension wealth. In practice deferring or avoiding annuitisation is unattractive for most individuals, except perhaps the very wealthy who are doing so for complicated tax reasons. If one defers annuitisation until 75 one must enter "drawdown", which is expensive and limits the amount of the fund that can be accessed. In particular this would severely limit the possibility for individuals who believed they had short life expectancy to bring forward consumption. To avoid annuitisation one must first demonstrate that one has a secure pension income (perhaps purchased from a portion of the pension fund) and then pay 55 per cent tax on that part of the pension fund which is not annuitised: the 55 per cent tax effectively reclaims all of the tax privileges that a higher-rate tax payer would have received from saving in a pension fund.
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For these reasons we can treat annuitisation of personal pension wealth as effectively compulsory for nearly all personal pensioners and the only choice available is the timing of annuitisation and the type of annuity purchased. Evidence from the Association of British Insurers shows that the vast majority of annuities are purchased at the conventional retirement ages of 55, 60 or 65, suggesting that timing is driven almost entirely by retirement (very few annuities are purchased at age 75, further evidence that the option to defer annuitising until then is not very important).
Despite the compulsory nature of annuitisation in the U.K., life assurers are unable to observe the consumption choices of the annuitants and the annuity payments may be very poor proxies for consumption. Most annuitants will have wealth other than their personal pension wealth which will not be observed by the life assurer.
At a minimum, annuitants are likely to have the UK's Basic State Pension, plus additional means-tested benefits derived from the Minimum Income Guarantee. Some annuitants will own a house (non-annuity wealth): those without housing wealth will receive Housing Benefit (since this will either be received until death or superceded by long-term care assistance, it is close to annuity wealth). On top of this, some annuitants will also have occupational pensions and other personal pensions: it is possible to have more than one personal pension fund and not necessary to combine them at the point of annuitisation. 16 Finally, in section 3.1 we assumed that no savings was allowed outside the annuity, but it would be possible 19 for a high-life expectancy annuitant to buy a nominal annuity and save a proportion of the annuity payments for consumption in period two.
For all of these reasons, a life assurer is only able to observe 1 2 aa on what may be a relatively small part of an annuitant's total wealth but not 12 cc which is what is needed to effect an R&S separating equilibrium.
Further, contract B in Figure 6 may not be allowed by regulators. Annuities in the compulsory purchase market have to be recognised by the tax authorities (HMRC).
In practice the types of annuity allowed are level (constant in nominal terms), RPIlinked (constant in real terms) and escalating (nominal payments rising at (typically) 3 or 5 per cent per year). In a low-inflation environment, a level annuity does not allow for much front-loading: translated to Figure 6 it might be that the most heavily front-loaded contract available is at point D. Unfortunately, offering contracts A and D will not result in a separating equilibrium. A corollary of this is line of reasoning is that it will be easier to achieve a separating equilibrium in a high-inflation environment, but the variation in inflation is too small during our period of observation to attempt to use this result.
We make one final comment on the effect of life assurers' administrative costs. Life assurers are involved in many sorts of insurance and long-term fund management and there are presumably large economies of scope. This means that it would be very difficult to allocate precisely all of the relevant costs to a firm's annuity business alone, let alone the costs of particular types or cohorts of annuitants.
However, as noted by F&P (2002) , it is probable that the costs of managing real annuities are higher than for level annuities. HM Treasury and Bank of England (1995) describe several reasons why the market for RPI-indexed bonds is thinner and less liquid than for conventional bonds and the differences are considere d sufficiently important that the bonds are issued in different types of auction (Debt Management Office, 2013) . Because fewer RPI-indexed bonds are issued this will almost certainly make complete cash-flow matching more difficult. However, we are unable to quantify the cost of this.
The Stochastic Money's Worth
In the previous section we showed how the pattern of observed money's worths might be due to life assurer's reserving against cohort mortality risk. In this section 20 we quantify this effect. This requires us to quantify the uncertainty in forecasting mortalities or, in the notation of section 3, the uncertainty in forecasting p. There are two components to this: first, one has to know that one has the correct data, the correct model and to be sure that the forecasting method will not be compromised by structural breaks; and second, given the previous considerations one has to have a stochastic model. We shall be ignoring all of the first set of considerations: we are using life office pensioner data (rather than personal pensioner data); from the array of potential models (e.g. described in Cairns et al, 2009) , we simply choose a model which is widely used and understood; the period after our data end was characterised by significant changes in models and forecasts due to the perception of structural breaks or cohort effects. By concentrating on the uncertainty within a particular model we are under-estimating the effect of uncertainty on the money's worth.
The model we use for this exercise is that of Lee and Carter (1992) model, which has been widely accepted as a starting point for mortality analysis. 17 The LC model has a flexible (non-parametric) relationship between age and log-mortality which is assumed to be constant: projection of mortality consists of simple shifts in the logmortality-age curve. More specifically, the one-year death probabilities are modelled as
which can be estimated by least-squares from a singular-value decomposition method (see Pitacco et al, 2008; Girosi and King, 2009 , for an exposition). 18 There are a variety of identification estimation issues which we discuss in Appendix B.
Regardless of the estimation procedure, forecasting is based upon
As a robustness check to our analysis we consider an alternative to the Lee-Carter approach: the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (2006) model, which builds on the empirical observation that the relationship between log-mortality and age is approximately linear, and uses this as a restriction in the estimation strategy.
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where the parameters  and 2   are estimated in a second-stage regression (and where a more complicated dynamic process than a random walk is also possible).
A simpler procedure is to ignore the fact that mortality is following a stochastic trend: Girosi and King (2009) Our estimate of the Lee-Carter model uses the UK's life office pensioner mortality data, which is the largest and most commonly used data for UK private pensions.
The data we use are for 1983-2000: 19 the typical exposed to risk for a given age in a given year is in the range 5,000-10,000, although there are fewer for very high ages.
The total exposed-to-risk in 1983 is 356,552 and in 2000 it is 289,019. This period, and the years immediately following it, demonstrated significant falls in mortality, requiring substantial revision to life tables as documented in Cannon and Tonks (2008, section 6.2) . 20 Consistent with Gompertz's law the alphas and betas are approximately linear in age, and the kappa is a stochastic trend. The fact that beta depends upon age shows that the trend in log-mortality is age dependent.
Using the estimated alphas and betas and with projected kappas, we can project survival probabilities into the future using numerical methods (we conduct a Monte Carlo with 100,000 replications). Figure 7 shows the survival fan chart for a male 19 Although detailed data on pensioner mortality were collected in the United Kingdom from 1948 the data prior to 1983 have been lost (CMI, 2002) . 20 In this data set no 60-year old male died in 1998, so the log mortality was not defined: we replaced the zero value by 0.5 (which corresponded to the lowest mortality rate observed elsewhere in the data set). A variety of alternative assumptions resulted in almost identical conclusions.
22 aged 65 at the end of the period of our data in 2001. Such fan charts have been discussed in Blake, Dowd and Cairns (2008) : there is relatively little uncertainty about the survival probability for the first few years: the probability of dying is small and there is little scope for uncertainty. However, by age 75 there is considerable uncertainty. Note that an annuity which was more back-dated (had longer duration) would have a higher proportion of its present value paid in the period of greater uncertainty and thus would be a riskier liability for a life assurer.
[ Figure 7 about here]
Using the distribution of survival probabilities from Figure 7 we then estimate the distribution of the value of an annuity paying £1 per year and illustrate this in Figure   8 for different interest rates, assuming that the yield curve is horizontal (the same interest rate at all terms). As expected, Figure 8 shows that, as the interest rises and the duration of the annuity falls, both the expected value of an annuity and the standard deviation fall.
[ Figure 8 about here] Table 4 shows the consequences for the money's worth if a life assurer prices annuities from the relevant centile of the distribution of annuity values but the researcher uses the expected annuity value. When priced from the median, the money's worth is approximately one, since the median and expectation are virtually the same. When the life assurer prices from the 99th centile, the money's worth is less than one and the discrepancy is larger the lower the interest rate (since the duration of the annuity rises and is where there is greater uncertainty).
The left-hand panel of the table shows the effect when there is no idiosyncratic mortality uncertainty: the figures are based purely on the uncertainty in the distribution of projected cohort mortality uncertainty. The right-hand panel quantifies the effect of idiosyncratic uncertainty that would be faced by a life assurer who sells only 400 annuities: in each Monte Carlo replication the future one-year death probabilities are generated for all ages and then the actual nu mber of deaths are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with the projected probability).
[ Table 4 about here]
We can now use the table to quantify the possible effect on the money's worth. In Figure 9 we illustrate our final calculations making use of the actual interest rates that were used in the money's worth calculations in Figures 2-4 . Notice, however, that we are using a constant set of mortality projections for the whole period, so our results are not directly comparable with the earlier graphs. Instead, Figure 9 isolates the effect that actual interest rate changes would have had on money's worth calculations had annuities been priced on the 95th centile (all calculations are for a male aged 65 and we make no allowance for idiosyncratic mortality risk).
Figure 9 reinforces our calculations in Table 4 : a significant part of the difference between nominal and real money's worths could be due to cohort risk.
[ Figure 9 about here]
In our discussion of Figure 5 we noted that there appeared to be a slight fall in the nominal money's worth between 1994 and 2012 and that the gap between the real money's worth and the nominal money's worth had risen. Both of those features are also evident in Figure 9 : this arises from the fall in interest rates which not only reduces the expected value of annuity payments (an effect capture in money's worth calculations) but also increases the uncertainty (which is not captured in money's worth calculations).
The striking difference between Figures 5 and 9 is the relative behaviour of real and escalating annuities, since escalating annuities have a consistently lower money's worth than real annuities in Figure 9 , but the reverse is true in Figure 5 . The empirical finding is equally problematic for the adverse selection model of 24 annuities, which would make the same qualitative predictions as our model (as noted by F&P, 2002) . Although not reported in the FSA Returns, we believe from discussions with practitioners that the number of escalating annuities is similar to the number of real annuities and therefore the difference cannot be due to idiosyncratic risk. This underlines the fact that administrative costs of real annuities have to be significantly higher than for nominal annuities for any model to fit the observed money's worths.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have updated our money's worth calculations for the UK compulsory purchase market -the biggest annuity market in the world -to 2012.
This provides a starting point for re-visiting the idea that there is adverse selection in the annuity market, following the analysis of F&P (2002). Some of their corroboratory evidence, such as the money's worth varying by age or guarantee period are no longer valid. However, their most important result, that back-loaded annuities have a lower money's worth than front-loaded annuities is still true in the UK annuity market.
Finkelstein and Poterba's explanation for this was that there is adverse selection and that a separating equilibrium is achieved via longer-lived individuals purchasing back-loaded annuities. When calculating the money's worth using the mortalities of all annuitants pooled together (i.e. the only mortality data that are available), this would result in back-loaded annuities having a lower money's worth.
In this paper we show that an alternative model yields exactly the same qualitative conclusions. Our model relies upon the fact that life assurers need to reserve against the uncertain evolution of cohort mortality, both for prudential reasons and because they are required to do so by government regulation. Because back-loaded annuities have a higher proportion of payouts in the more distant future, they are inherently riskier products and require greater reserves. Table shows the ratio of the relevant quantile of the annuity distribution to the mean, from equation (9). The projection is made from the Lee-Carter model, assuming parameter uncertainty. The left-hand panel assumes that there are sufficiently many policies that the only risk is from projecting the cohort mortality: the right-hand panel combines cohort mortality risk with additional risk from having only 400 policy holders.
Appendix A: Description of the data
Data on UK annuity rates for males and females at various ages are taken from
MoneyFacts over the period August 1994 to April 2012 and update the annuity series that we have published previously: the construction of these series is described in more detail in Tonks (2008, 2010) . These are compulsory-purchase annuities which are bought as part of a pension scheme (where tax relief has been
given on the accumulation of the pension fund via an EET scheme).
From about 2011 some life assurers started to price annuities based on the postcode of the annuitant (life expectancy varies by region and postcode has considerable predictive power): where life assurers did this the annuity rate data we have is for a "typical" postcode -but the definition of "typical" is decided by the life assurer and we do not know what definition is used. Notice further that from December 2012 it became impossible to price annuities for men and women differently under the ECJ directive, so there would be little point in extending our analysis to later time periods as there will be further changes to the market due to unisex pricing.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the annuity rate series for a 65-year old male over time compared with government bond data, and summary statistics of this data for nominal and real variables is presented in Tables A1 and A2 . All bond data is taken from the Bank of England web-site. It can be seen that nominal annuities approximately track the nominal bond yield and analogously for real annuities:
annuity rates are highly correlated with long-term bond yields, and the average difference in these two series over the sample period was 2.86%. We also compare the two sub-periods up to the financial crisis (Northern Rock bank run in August 2007) and since the onset of the crisis. Since the crisis, both short-term (base rate) and long-term government bond yields have fallen, and this has been reflected in a fall in annuity rates. Real annuities have payments that rise in line with the UK's Retail Price Index. Table 1a presents descriptive statistics on the monthly time series of average annuity rates in the CPA market, long-term and short-term government bond yields and rates on retail term deposits, over the period 1994 to 2012 and for the two sub-periods. Table 1b presents descriptive statistics on the monthly time series of average real annuity rates in the CPA market and real long-term government bond yields over the period 1994 to 2012 and for the two sub-periods.
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The remaining data that we need to estimate the money's worth are the mortality projections. In previous money's worth calculations (Cannon and Tonks, 2004 ) we attempted to update the mortality projections at the time that the life assurers did so. We did not try to infer the mortality tables used by the life assurers from the footnotes of the FSA Returns because of a variety of problems:
each FSA Return contains a variety of assumptions; there are a large number of companies; and until recently the footnotes of the FSA Returns were not easily available. Instead we started using each new table from the Institute of Actuaries from a year before the publication date, on the argument that the broad outline of these data may have been known to life assurers before actual publication (and life assurers would also have been able to analyse the mortality experience of their own annuitants).
The PML80 ("Purchased Male Life") table was published in 1992 ("80" refers to the base year). Although it projected gradual increases in life expectancy, by the late 1990s it had become clear that the downward trend in mortality of pensioners was much stronger and the PML92 tables (published 1999) revised life expectancy up by almost two years. Further analysis of the reduction in mortality both for pensioners and people of below pension age (for which pension data were unavailable: life assurance data was used instead), suggested a "cohort" effect, ie a discrete downward jump in mortality for people born after about 1930. This led to a set or "interim adjustments" published in 2002: the most widely used "medium cohort" adjustment is illustrated here. In 2005 information on the most recent annuitant mortality was published (the "00" table), which did not have an accompanying projection for changes into the future. Accordingly at that time many life assur ers used the "00" table as a base and then used the "medium cohort" projection from 2000 (or some other year) onwards. 
